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The basis determinants: The European Case 
Abstract 
With subprime mortgage crisis, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy and 
European government credit crisis, the CDS market assisted to a generalized turmoil, 
contributing for a decrease of CDS market in more than 50% in less than 3 years. 
This dissertation focuses on testing possible determinants of the basis spread for several 
European companies, analysing data between June 18 2008 and December 31 2012. All 
financial information and data used in this thesis was gathered from Bloomberg. 
Literature on single-name credit modelling and valuing credit derivatives is revised and 
applied to calculate the basis, with special focus on estimating hazard rates, where we 
used the optimization method instead of the generally used bootstrap method. 
We than, followed Zhu work and analysed the proposed determinants for the basis, 
updating his work by introducing two new variables as potential determinants of the 
basis: the CDS Big Bang and the Lehman Brothers bailout.  
Finally, we have found some evidence that efforts to standardize and regulate the credit 
derivative contracts, the CDS Big Bang has contributed to mitigate part of the 
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Introduction 
Credit default swaps (CDS) have not only become the most widely used credit 
derivative, but have also turned into a journalistic buzz word due to subprime mortgage 
crisis in late-2000s and, more recently, due to European sovereign credit crisis. 
These richness of events in the last 5 years, start to struggle the credit derivatives desks 
in major financial institutions in order to price their products. One of the major 
parameter to price a credit derivative is the spread, which represents the credit risk of a 
name involved in the deal and it had no more logic. Subsequently, most of the products 
could not be priced any longer, creating some discrepancies in their value and 
subsequently some arbitrage opportunities. 
One of those arbitrage opportunities relied on taking advantage of the difference 
between the asset-swap spread and the CDS of the respective underline. This difference 
is called basis. In a market without any arbitrage opportunity the basis is expected to be 
zero, but recently this basis has moved deeply away from zero. 
One of the most interesting papers regarding the basis determinants, where developed 
by (Zhu, 2006). Zhu analyses data between the years 1999 and 2002 and addresses two 
major concerns that have significant implications for financial regulators and risk 
managers. First, is credit risk equally priced between the derivatives market and the 
cash market? Zhu, refers this question as accuracy of credit risk pricing issue, where 
low financial transparency and the existence of asymmetric information between 
protection buyers and sellers leads to potential arbitrage of credit risk across markets. 
Second, which market reacts more rapidly to changes in credit conditions? This 
question, reports to price discovery efficiency of both markets, where traders could take 
potential gains from price differentials.  
Using Zhu’s work, we have applied the same framework for the between years 2008 
and 2012, but with the introduction of two new dummy variables: the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy (September 15 2008) and CDS Big Bang (April 8 2009). 
With the Lehman Brothers bailout, it is expected that the basis move away from zero, 
hence the risk perception in the market players has worsen. On the opposite, with the 
CDS Big Bang, it is expected that the basis approximate more to zero, because after 
April 8 2009 where introduced changes in CDS contracts and conventions in order to 
make CDS more standardised and consequently to help central clearing of CDS trades, 
mitigating the counterpart risk. 
With our investigation, we tried to bring new information for the bank’s derivatives 
desk, in order to contribute for the definition of the liquidity premia necessary to face 
future credit events. Thus, it is expected to answer the following questions: Does the 
Lehman Brothers bailout augment the risk perception? In which way affected the basis? 
Does the Big Bang event helped to mitigate the counterpart risk? How it influenced the 
basis? How does rating events and liquidity influence the basis? 
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Finally, unlike Zhu did in his paper, hazard rates are taken through the optimization 
process and not through bootstrapping method. The optimization method has the 
advantage of dealing with the liquidity of CDS quotes, putting more emphasis in liquid 
ones and less emphasis in illiquid maturities. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 starts to briefly analyse the 
dimension of the credit derivative market, explain what is a CDS and introduces a 
theoretical background regarding the main models of CDS valuation. Chapter 3 explains 
in detailed the analysis framework used in this dissertation, including the relationship 
between the credit spreads in the bond market and the derivatives market from a 
theoretical perspective. Chapter 4 describes the data. Chapter 5 identifies the 
determinants of the basis. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Background Theory 
What is a Credit Default Swap? 
The most important credit derivative is the credit default swap (CDS). This is a contract 
between two parties, where one party transfers to another the credit risk of a reference 
entity, corporate or sovereign, for a specific period of time. A CDS is designed to 
protect an investor against the loss from par on a bond or loan following the credit event 
of the reference entity, including bankruptcy, failure-to-pay and restructuring. In return 
for this, the protection buyer pays a premium to the protection seller. 
There are also a number of option-based credit derivatives. These include single-name 
default swaptions in which the option buyer has the option to enter into a CDS contract 
on a future date. More recently, we have assisted to the growth of portfolio swaptions, 
where the holder has the option to enter into a portfolio of CDS. These contracts work 
by “tranching” up the credit risk of the underlying portfolio. Tranching is a mechanism 
by which different securities or tranches are structured so that any default losses in the 
portfolio are incurred in a specific order. The first default losses are incurred by the 
riskiest equity tranche. If the size of these losses exceeds the face value of the equity 
tranche then the remaining losses are incurred by the mezzanine tranche. If there are 
still remaining losses after this, then these are incurred by the senior tranches. The risk 
of this credit derivatives contract is sensitive to the tendency of the credits in the 
portfolio to default together. This is known as default correlation and, for this reason, 
these derivatives are known as correlation products. 
An important extension of the CDS is the CDS index. This product allows the investor 
to enter into a portfolio consisting of 100 or more different CDS in one transaction, 
exposing the issuer to the default risk of more than one credit or “name”, we call this 
transaction multi-name product. The multi-name products have several advantages to 
the single-name products, mainly considerable liquidity and diversification. 
Lastly, we have the credit Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) structure and 
the more recent Constant Proportion Debt Obligation (CPDO) structure. These 
structures exploit a rule-based dynamic trading strategy typically involving a CDS 
index. In the case of CPPI, it is designed to provide a leveraged credit exposure while 
protecting the investor’s principal. In the case of CPDO, the strategy is designed to 
produce a high coupon with low default risk. Due to the complexity involving the 
valuation of multi-named products, we will focus our thesis in single-named products. 
Single-name credit modelling – Default rate statistics 
In order to define a model for pricing credit derivatives, we need to establish a 
modelling framework which can capture the appropriate risks, which includes default 
risk, recovery rate risk, spread risk, interest rate risk and credit rating transition risk. 
Default risk is the risk that a planned payment of interest or principal on a bond or loan 
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is not received. Recovery risk is the risk that following a default, the size of the 
recovered amount is less than the amount due. Spread risk is the risk that the value of a 
credit security falls as the market’s view regarding the credit quality of the borrower 
changes, causing us to realise a loss if we sell the credit security. Interest rate risk is the 
risk that changes in the level of the treasury curve will cause the value of the credit 
security to fall. Credit rating transition risk is the risk of credit note change of the 
reference entity or issuance. 
Default is a complex event that can occur for several reasons. In some cases it is an 
entirely idiosyncratic event that strikes just one company. In other cases can be a 
systemic event in which several companies or sovereigns are all affected by the same 
factor. 
The main sources of default statistics are the credit rating agencies. In order to better 
assess the issuers’ credit quality, they have collected a significant amount of data over 
their lifetime. In order to measure default, it is important to understand the default 
definition. According to Moody’s, a default is “any missed or delayed payment of 
interest or principal, bankruptcy or distressed exchange where, 
(i) the issuer offered bondholders a new security or package of securities that 
amount to a diminished financial obligation (such as preferred or common 
stock or debt with a lower coupon or par amount), or 
(ii) the exchange had apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default”.  
If a failure to pay principal or coupon occurs as a result of some omission, which is 
quickly rectified, then the event is known as technical default. Such an occurrence is not 
usually included in rating agency default statistics. 
The rating agency methodology for calculating default statistics has been to construct 
databases of issuers and to monitor the dating and default behaviour of the senior 
unsecured bonds of each issuer through time. This is done by identifying a cohort – a 
group of issuers with the same initial rating. The rating agency then keeps track of the 
cohort and records if any of the issuers default. As a result, it is possible to calculate the 
number of defaults in each cohort. Dividing this by the number of issuers in the cohort 
gives the average default rate of issuers with a specific rating. Each year new cohorts 
are defined. Averages can then be taken across cohorts with different initial dates but 
with the same initial rating to give a time-averaged default rate for each rating class. 
The next table shows time-averaged cumulative default rates and so has averaged out 
any time variability in default rate statistics. In practice, market participants will use 
these historical default rates as proxies for the default probabilities used within their 
credit risk models. This assumes that time-averaged historical default rates by rating are 
a good predictor of future default rates, and that all issuers with the same rating have the 
same probability of default. It therefore ignores the current state of the credit 
environment and differences in credit quality that exist within a rating category. The 
averages are global, so that differences in the triggering of default and the workout 
process which may exist across different legal jurisdictions are not captured. The data is 
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also biased towards US corporate credits since this has traditionally been the dominant 
market for corporate credit bonds. However, this issue is now being addressed by the 
rating agencies that have recently begun to produce separate statistics for the European 
credit market. 
Figure 1 Average cumulative default rates of corporate bond issuers by letter rating from 1983 to 2005 
Cumulative default rate (%) 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Aaa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Aa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
A 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Baa 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.5 
Ba 1.3 3.6 6.3 9.0 11.1 12.9 14.5 15.8 16.9 17.8 
B 5.7 12.1 17.6 21.8 25.1 27.7 29.6 30.8 31.6 32.1 
Caa-C 21.0 30.3 36.1 39.5 41.2 42.1 42.6 42.9 43.1 43.3 
Source: Hamilton et al. (2005). 
Historical default data is not used by the market for determining the price of a security. 
It is primarily used as a way of calibrating risk models. When we come to pricing credit 
risky assets such as credit derivatives, we need to be in a world in which we can hedge 
out the risk that these contracts present. For that, we need to be in a risk-neutral 
framework. 
Single-name credit modelling – Recovery rate statistics 
Credit risk is also about the risk associated with the amount of the claim that can be 
recovered after default. In the credit derivatives market, the recovery price is the price 
of some reference obligation determined within 72 days of the default event. The 
measure of recovery rate used in the credit markets is the defaulted bond price divided 
by the face value. There are a number of sources for recovery data. In our study, we will 
a recovery rate of 40% of the face value. This value, is used as general accepted in most 
models of CDS valuation, and is based on the study performed by Altman et al. 
(2003b). In this study, it is empirically estimated recovery rates based on prices just 
after default on loans.  The following table resumes the findings: 
 
Figure 2 Empirical estimates of recovery rates 








Senior secured Loans 155 73.00 68.50 24.4 
Senior unsecured Loans 28 50.50 55.00 28.4 
Senior secured Bonds 220 54.49 52.84 23.1 
Senior unsecured Bonds 910 42.27 34.89 26.6 
Senior subordinated Bonds 395 32.35 30.17 25.0 
Subordinated Bonds 248 31.96 29.03 22.5 
All bonds and loans  1909 40.05 34.31 24.9 
Source: Altman et al. (2003b) 
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The pricing of credit derivatives 
The pricing of credit derivatives is not an easy task. One of the major reasons is that the 
market price of the underlying asset is not often easily observable. This is particularly 
applicable for loans, which are rarely traded in a secondary market. Nevertheless, if the 
underlying company is rated by an agency, the rating can be used as a proxy to value the 
respective debt, but published ratings are often outdate, since agencies are not able to 
analyse the underlying debt on a timely basis, and defaults are rare events. Especially, 
since a company typically only defaults once, empirical data on the default of a solvent 
company is typically unavailable. 
In addition, default is usually triggered by a combination of factors, like as credit, 
market and operational risk, whose correlation has to be integrated into the pricing 
model. Moreover, with credit derivatives, the counterparty risk is an important pricing 
element, since the default of the underlying debt typically leads to a large settlement 
payment of the protection selling counterparty. Ideally, the correlation between the 
default risk of the counterparty and the default risk of the underlying debt should be 
considered in the pricing process. All this makes pricing credit derivatives complex. 
Lastly, there is no pricing model generally accepted as a benchmark as, for example, the 
Black-Scholes model for standard options. Additionally, incorporating all input 
variables, summarized in the next table, it is not trivial. 
Figure 3 List of variables for valuing a credit derivatives price 
Input for deriving the price of a credit derivative 
1) Default probability and credit deterioration probability of the reference asset 
2) Default probability and credit deterioration probability of the credit derivatives seller 
3) Correlation between 1) and 2) 
4) Volatility of the underlying reference asset 
5) Volatility of the credit derivatives seller 
6) Correlation between 4) and 5) 
7) Maturity of the credit derivative 
8) Expected recovery rate of the reference asset 
9) Expected recovery rate of the credit derivatives seller 
10) Return of the reference asset (e.g. coupon of the reference bond) 
11) Risk-free interest rate term structure used to discount future cash-flows 
12) Default probability of the credit derivatives buyer in case of periodic credit derivative premium 
13) Expected recovery rate of the credit derivatives buyer in case of periodic credit derivative premium 
14) Correlation between de default probability of the credit derivatives buyer and the reference asset in case of 
periodic credit derivatives premium 
15) Market risks (as interest rate risk, currency risk, commodity risk, and stock price risk) and the correlation 
between market risk and credit risk 
16) Operational risks (e.g. legal risks, documentation risks, or settlement risks), which might endanger the 
enforceability of the payoff and the correlation between operational risk and credit risk 
17) Liquidity of the credit derivative 
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18) Liquidity of the underlying reference asset 
19) BIS risk weight on the credit derivatives seller 
20) Urgency of protection (e.g. in an immediate credit deterioration expected or does the protection free up credit 
lines to enable further business with a client) 
21) Transaction costs 
Source: (Meissner, 2005) 
 
Furthermore, the credit risk models can be divided into two major groups, the structural 
models and reduced form models (also known as intensity-based models). The 
structural models were pioneered by (Merton, 1974), in his framework a firm issues two 
types of assets: equities and bonds. A default occurs if the total asset value falls below a 
default boundary, this is a level of asset value, sufficiently low so that the firm decides 
to default on its debt if asset value falls beneath this level. By contrast, reduced form 
models treat default as a random stopping time with stochastic arrival intensity. The 
credit spread is determined by risk neutral valuation under the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities. This method has been widely used in the pricing of CDSs, the main 
literature was developed by (Jarrow & Turnbull, 1995), (Das, 1995), (Duffie, 1999), 
(Duffie & Singleton, 1999), (Das & Sundaram, 2000), (Madan & Unal, 2000), (Hull & 
White, 2000, 2001), (Archarya, et al., 2002), (Jarrow & Yildirim, 2002), (Das, et al., 
2003) and (Schönbucher, 2003). 
Before we discuss structural and reduced-form models in detail, is important to 
understand simple pricing features of credit derivatives, namely the default swap 
premium derived from asset swaps, deriving the default swap premium using arbitrage 
arguments and obtaining the default probability on a binomial model. 
Deriving the default swap premium using arbitrage arguments 
An important arbitrage argument, used in trading practice to help determine the price of 
a default swap can be expressed in the following terms: 
 Default swap premium = Return on risky bond – Return on risk-free bond. (1) 
This equation can only serve as an approximation, hence it abstracts from several 
inputs, already described, which have to be included in the pricing of a default swap. 
One of the most important points, not included in the previous equation, is the 
counterparty risk, this is the risk that the default protection seller defaults. In addition, 
the correlation between counterparty default risk and default risk of the underlying asset 
assumes also a degree of importance, since the default protection buyer will incur a loss 
in the amount of his reference asset value plus the default swap premium (minus the 
recovery rate of the reference asset issuer and the counterparty), if both the protection 
seller and the underlying asset default. 
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Obtaining the default probability on a binomial model 
One of the most important features when pricing credit derivatives is deriving the 
probability of default of the underlying debt. 
We can model the default in a one-period setting as a binomial tree, which we survive 
with probability 1- λ(s)ds or default and receive a recovery value R with probability 
λ(s)ds. For a n-period, the risky debt with a notional amount of 1, can be designed as 
follows: 
Figure 4 Binomial model to find the risk-neutral probability of default 
 
Risk-neutrality is an important concept when pricing derivatives. If investors are risk-
neutral, they do not require a compensation for taking risk. As a consequence, the 
expected return on all securities (including derivatives) is the risk-free interest rate. 
Hence, the present value of any security can be derived by discounting all future cash 
flows with the risk-free interest rate. 
 
Valuing credit derivatives using Structural Models 
As we have presented earlier, structural models derive the probability of default by 
analysing the capital structure of a firm, especially the value of the firm’s assets 
compared to the value of the firm’s debt.  
The original 1974 Merton model 
In 1974 Robert Merton created a firm value model to estimate a company’s value of 
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The Merton call 
Merton combined the simple equation, shareholders’ equity (E) = company’s assets (V) 
– company’s liabilities (D), with the Black-Scholes option pricing framework. Merton’s 
model is mathematically identical with the original Black-Scholes equation for valuing 
a call: 








 and 𝑑! = 𝑑! − 𝛿! 𝑇 
where E0 is the current value of equity, V0 is the current value of assets, D is the debt to 
be repaid at time T, N is the cumulative standard normal distribution, r is the risk-free 
continuously compounded interest rate, 𝛿! is the expected volatility of the asset, and T 
is the option maturity, measured in years. The previous equation states that equity 
holders have a claim on the assets of a company: If the asset value V increases, the 
equity value E will increase with unlimited upside potential; on the downside, it the debt 
D exceeds the assets V, the company will go bankrupt. In this case the equity holders 
will take the remaining assets to repay part of the debt, the equity value being zero. 
A well-known property of the Black/Scholes model is that the risk-neutral probability of 
exercising a call option is N(𝑑!). Therefore, the probability of not exercising the option 
is N(−𝑑!). Not exercising the equity option means that the debt D is bigger than the 
assets V. This is the case of bankruptcy. Therefore, the probability of default in the 
Merton framework is N(−𝑑!). 
 
The Merton put 
The value of credit risk and the probability of a company’s default in Merton’s model 
can also be found by expressing credit risk with the help of a put option on the assets of 
the company: The equity holders can hedge the credit risk by buying a put on the assets 
with strike D, the put seller being the asset holders. In case of default, i.e. V < D, the 
equity holders will deliver the assets to the asset holders, the loss for the asset holders 
being D – V. Thus, the put option can be expressed as in the following equation: 








 and 𝑑! = 𝑑! − 𝛿! 𝑇 
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where 𝑃! is the current value of a put option on the company’s assets V with strike D, σ 
is the volatility of the underlying asset, and T is the option maturity expressed in years. 
The equity holders will exercise the put option in the last equation at time T if D > V. In 
the Merton model, this is the case of bankruptcy. Thus the probability of exercising the 
put, which is 𝑁(−𝑑!), is again the probability of default. 
Rewriting the previous equation as 𝑃! = −
! !!!
! !!!
𝑉! + 𝐷𝑒!!" 𝑁(−𝑑!) results in an 
intuitive interpretation of the default risk, where the term ! !!!
! !!!
𝑉! reflects the amount 
retrieved of the asset value 𝑉! in case of default, thus the recovery value. The term 
𝐷𝑒!!" is the present value of the debt, thus − ! !!!
! !!!
𝑉! + 𝐷𝑒!!"  is the present value 
of the loss in the event of default. Multiplying − ! !!!
! !!!
𝑉! + 𝐷𝑒!!"  with the 
probability of default 𝑁(−𝑑!) gives the present value of the default risk, which equals 
the put value 𝑃!. 
The put option in equation (3) serves as a basis to find a closed form solution for the 
value of the underlying risky bond B. We can start by expressing 𝐵! as the debt D to be 
repaid at time T discounted by 𝑒!!" minus the value of the credit risk, which is the put 
in equation (3): 
 𝐵! = 𝐷!𝑒!!" − −𝑉!𝑁 −𝑑! + 𝐷𝑒!!"𝑁(−𝑑!)   (4) 
Rearranging the equation and assuming 1-N(-𝑑!)= N(𝑑!) results in the value of the 
risky bond of: 








 and 𝑑! = 𝑑! − 𝛿! 𝑇 
One drawback of Merton’s model is that we need the asset value V and the asset 
volatility 𝛿! as inputs. Both parameters are not easily available in practice. However the 
equity value E and the equity volatility 𝛿! are observable. Using equation (2) and 




  (6) 
We have two equations with two unknowns to solve for, V and 𝛿!. 
As mention earlier, the Merton model serves as a basis for structural and reduced form 
models that value credit risk. Meanwhile, the model simplifies a number of aspects. It 
principally only allows default at the maturity of the debt T and the debt can only take 
the form of zero-coupon bonds. Coupons as well as different seniorities cannot be 
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handled. There is only one bankruptcy event, which occurs when the asset value falls 
below the value of the debt at maturity of the debt. Other bankruptcy event such as 
illiquidity, restructuring of debt, or a moratorium is not taken into account. 
Nevertheless, the Merton model has served as an excellent basis for developing more 
realistic complex models. 
 
The Black-Cox 1976 model 
(Black & Cox, 1976) suggest an exogenous exponential default boundary with two 
exogenous constants, k and γ. If the asset value drops below the default boundary during 
a period of time, the asset holders can force the company in to bankruptcy or 
restructuring. The mandatory bankruptcy or restructuring, expressed as a safety 
covenant of the asset holders, is an important feature of the model. It protects asset 
holders from further deterioration of the company’s assets. In that sense a high value of 
k and a low value of γ forces early bankruptcy or restructuring and principally protects 
asset holders. 
Besides safety covenants, Black and Cox also investigate subordination arrangements 
and restrictions for the equity holders to finance interest and dividend payments. All 
three provisions tend to increase the value of the risky bond. 
Black and Cox also find a closed form solution for the risky bonds, which includes 
(continuous) dividends to the stockholders and the underlying interest rate process and 
the recovery rate are rather simple. Interest rates do not follow a stochastic process but 
are assumed constant at a constant rate and the recovery rate is simply set to the asset 
value at the time of default. 
 
The Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan 1993 Model 
(Kim, et al., 1993) use a simpler default boundary but a more realistic stochastic interest 
rate process than Black and Cox. Default is triggered if the asset value drops below a 
exogenous constant variable. The interest rate process follows the risk neutral Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model, where interest rates mean-revert with a defined rate to the long-
term average of rates. These rates cannot get negative, because are taken to the square 
root. 
The default boundary in this model takes into account the coupon rate and the cash 
outflow of the firm. Thus the default boundary is endogenous but not time-dependent as 
in the Black-Cox model. The recovery rate is the minimum of the asset value and the 
face value of the debt, if default occurs before the debt maturity, the recovery rate is the 
minimum of an exogenous recovery rate expressed in percentage of a risk-free bond and 
the asset value. 
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According to the authors of the study, this model had better results in deriving realistic 
default swap premiums than the original Merton model. 
 
The Longstaff-Schwartz 1995 model 
(Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995) suggest a first-time passage model with an exogenous 
and constant default boundary and recovery rate. For the interest rate, Longstaff and 
Schwartz use the Vasicek1 model. 
With the help of the closed form solution for a zero-coupon bond derived in the Vasicek 
model, Longstaff and Schwartz find a solution for the price of risky zero-coupon bonds 
and floating rate bonds. 
Key findings of Longstaff and Schwartz imply that credit-spreads decrease when the 
risk-free Treasury rate increases. This appears counterintuitive but can be explained by 
the fact that a higher interest rate means a higher growth rate of the asset value. As a 
consequence of the higher asset value the probability of default is lower, and with it the 
credit-spreads. 
The inverse relationship between long term risk-free interest rates and credit-spread is 
stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is intuitive since a strong growth in the 
asset value can improve the asset-liability relationship of a low rated firm to a 
significant degree. 
Drawbacks of the Longstaff-Schwartz model are the complex parameter calibration of 
the numerous parameters for the bond equations, and the fact that the underlying 
Vasicek model for interest rates is generally not arbitrage-free. 
 
The Briys-deVarenne 1997 model 
In 1997, (Briys & Varenne, 1997) addressed shortcomings of the Black-Cox, Kim-
Ramaswamy-Sundaresan, and Longstaff-Schwartz models. In these models, the payoff 
to bondholders in case of bankruptcy may be larger than the firm’s asset value. In this 
respect, payoff demands of the equity holders are not taken into account. Consequently, 
Briys and de Varenne suggest a default boundary and recovery rate, which guarantee 
that the payoff to bondholders at the time of default is realistic with respect to demands 
from the equity holders, and cannot be higher than the firm’s asset value. 
 
Critical appraisal of structural models 
The major achievement of the models presented is that unlike in the original Merton 
model, default before the maturity of the debt at time T is possible. However, several 
                                                
1 Vasicek model is a mathematical model describing the evolution of interest rates. 
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significant drawbacks remain. First, with the exception of the Kim-Ramaswamy-
Sundaresan model, the default boundary involves an exogenous constant. Furthermore, 
the recovery rate of the models, with the exception of the Black-Cox model, also 
involves an exogenous constant. Consequently the default boundary and recovery rate 
are difficult to determine for practical purposes. 
In addition, the closed form solutions for the risky bond price, equations of the four last 
models are quite complex and the calibration of the numerous parameters to match 
market credit-spreads is difficult in trading practice. Other shortcomings of structural 
models include the fact that some underlying stochastic processes for the asset value 
(e.g. CIR2 and Vasicek) are generally not arbitrage-free. Altogether, these drawbacks 
have so far limited the use structural models in credit risk practice. 
 
Valuing credit derivatives using Reduced form Models 
They are called reduced form, since they abstract from the explicit economic reasons for 
the default, i.e. they do not include the asset-liability structure of the firm to explain the 
default. Rather, reduced form models use debt prices as a main input to model the 
bankruptcy process. Default is modelled by a stochastic process with an exogenous 
default intensity or hazard rate, which multiplied by a certain time frame, results in the 
risk-neutral default probability, also called pseudo-or martingale3 default probability. 
The value of hazard rate is derived by calibration of the variables of the stochastic 
process. Since reduced form models only model the timing of the default not the 
severity, the recovery rate is usually exogenous. 
 
The Jarrow-Turnbull 1995 model 
(Jarrow & Turnbull, 1995) were one of the first to derive the value of credit derivative 
and to price credit derivatives in the arbitrage-free reduced form model environment. 
They combine a process for risk-free interest rates and a bankruptcy process of the risky 
debt to derive default probabilities and credit derivatives prices. The two processes are 
assumed to be independent from each other. 
Let’s define P as the price of the risk-free zero-coupon bond with notional amount 1 and 
maturity at time 2. 𝜋! is the risk-neutral probability of an interest rate increase. This 
brings us to the following interest rate tree: 
 
Figure 5 Risk-free interest rate tree in the Jarrow-Turnbull model 
                                                
2 Cox–Ingersoll–Ross model (or CIR model) describes the evolution of interest rates. 
3 In probability theory, martingale refers to model, which past events doesn’t help to predict future events. 
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Where r = risk-free interest rate, P = risk-free zero-coupon bond price 
 
Figure 6 Bankruptcy process of risky bond B in the Jarrow-Turnbull model 
 
The risk-free bond price at time t with maturity T, is Pt,T = 1/ (1 + rt,T). Since r1u > r1d, it 
follows that P1u > P1d. 
Let B be the price of a risky zero-coupon bond with a notional amount of 1 and maturity 
at time2. Let λ be the risk-neutral probability of default, (1-λ) the risk-neutral 
probability of survival, and RR the recovery rate in case of default. Thus, we derive the 
default process for the risky bond B, in the Figure 6  























 1 − 𝜆! 
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𝑅𝑅 
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Figure 7 A combined interest rate and bankruptcy process 
 
The unique, risk-neutral or pseudo-probabilities λ and π guarantee that the prices P and 
B are martingales, this means that past events doesn’t help to forecast the future, thus 
the model is arbitrage-free. Furthermore, the Markov4 property allows displaying the 
combined interest rate and bankruptcy tree as a recombining tree. They also use a 
foreign exchange rate analogy to model the risky bond price B. The risky bond price at 
any time t with maturity T, Bt,T, is equal to the risk-free bond price Pt,T multiplied with 
the “exchange rate” e, which is 1 in case of no default and equal to the recovery rate RR 
in case of default. Thus Bt,T = Pt,T et. If E(eT) is the expected payoff at time T, the risky 
bond price can be expressed as: 
 
 𝐵!,! = 𝑃!,!𝐸(𝑒!).  (7) 
The previous equation states that the risky bond price is the expected payoff E(eT) 
discounted by the risk-free price Pt,T. 
The shortcomings of the Jarrow-Turnbull 1995 model lie in the basic approach of the 
model: the direct economic reasons for default, i.e. the company’s specific asset-liability 
structure or the company’s liquidity are not part of the analysis. Rather, bond prices are 
the major input, assuming that bond prices can serve to reflect the credit risk of the 
debtor and to derive default probabilities. However, it has been shown that bond prices 
overestimate a company’s probability of default quite substantially (Altman, 1989). In 
addition, bond prices are often illiquid, resulting in difficulties in determining a fair 
mid-market price. 
                                                
4 A stochastic process has the Markov property if the conditional probability distribution of future states 
of the process depends only upon the present state, not on the sequence of events that preceded it. 
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Additionally, it is assumed that the interest rate process and the default process are 
independent. Also, the default intensity is assumed constant, thus default is equally 
likely over the life of the debt. Last, the recovery rate of the model does not depend on 
the model variables, but is exogenous. 
These shortcomings were addressed in extensions of the model, as in the Jarrow-Lando-
Turnbull 1997 model. 
 
The Jarrow-Lando-Turnbull 1997 model 
(Jarrow, et al., 1997) derive default probabilities and valuation methods for credit 
derivatives not from rather illiquid bond prices, but on basis of historical transition 
probabilities. The analysis is done within the arbitrage-free martingale framework. 
However, Markov properties are not mandatory since the martingale transition 
probabilities, also termed risk-neutral, may depend on historical data up to the present. 
Let’s first look at a historical default matrix, as shown in the next figure: 
Figure 8 Average global cumulative historical default rates with respect to time 
Cumulative default rate (%) 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Aaa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.3 0.4 0.52 0.64 
Aa 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.46 0.57 0.65 0.73 
A 0.02 0.09 0.22 0.36 0.51 0.68 0.86 1.07 1.31 1.56 
Baa 0.22 0.61 1.08 1.69 2.25 2.81 3.38 3.94 4.58 5.26 
Ba 1.28 3.51 6.09 8.76 11.36 13.74 15.66 17.6 19.46 21.29 
B 6.51 14.16 21.03 27.04 32.31 36.73 40.97 44.33 47.17 50.01 
Caa-C 23.83 37.12 47.43 55.05 60.09 65.22 69.26 73.88 76.50 78.54 
Source: Moody’s Investor Service, April 2003 
 
 
We can get the annual default probability from the previous table, through taking the 
difference in the cumulative default probability for each entry. Doing so, we get the 
following table: 
Figure 9 Average global annual default rates with respect to time 
Default rate (%) 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Aaa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12 
Aa 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 
A 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.25 
Baa 0.22 0.39 0.47 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.68 
Ba 1.28 2.23 2.58 2.67 2.60 2.38 1.92 1.94 1.86 1.83 
B 6.51 7.65 6.87 6.01 5.27 4.42 4.24 3.36 2.84 2.84 
Caa-C 23.83 13.29 10.31 7.62 5.04 5.13 4.04 4.62 2.62 2.04 
Source: Moody’s Investor Service, April 2003 
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From the previous table we can see that the historical default probability stays constant 
or increases slightly in time for highly rated credit. However, for low credits such as 
Caa, the probability of a default decreases with increasing time. This seems quite 
intuitive, since for a company with a bad rating, the coming years are the most crucial 
ones. Once they have passed, it can be assumed that the probability of default declines. 
The last two tables only express the probability of a certain credit to move to default, 
i.e. to move to credit state, Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull use a transition matrix in their 
analysis. A transition matrix Λ shows the historical transition probability of a credit in 
state i to move to a credit in state j, within a certain time frame, thus 
𝜆   =   
𝜆!!             𝜆!"             ⋯ 𝜆!!
𝜆!"         𝜆!!                   ⋯ 𝜆!!
⋮
𝜆!!!,! 𝜆!!!,!   ⋯ 𝜆!!!,!
0 0 1
 
Where the transition probabilities 𝜆!"   ≥ 0 for all i,j. The probability of default for a 
certain credit state i, 𝜆!,!  , is in the last column of Λ. The probability of survival for a 
bond in rating class i, 𝑄! = 𝑞!,! = 1− 𝜆!,!!!! . The probability of remaining in the 
same credit state is on the diagonal and is 𝜆!,! = 1− 𝜆!,!!!!
!!!
. 
The last row in Λ expresses that a credit that has defaulted stays in default. Hence, the 
transition probability 0, and the probability to stay in default is 1. In the following table, 
82.83 reflects the probability of a credit, for instance a bond, which is currently rated A 
to stay in A; 0.47 reflects the probability of a bond that is currently rate A to migrate to 
B; 0.14 is the probability of a bond currently rated B to move to A. 
 
Figure 10 One-year historical transition matrix of year 2002 (numbers in %) 
  Rating at year-end 
  Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Default WR 
Initial 
Rating 
Aaa 86.82 7.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.43 
Aa 1.38 82.23 12.12 0.14 0 0 0 0 4.13 
A 0 2.18 82.83 8.86 1.01 0.47 0.08 0.16 4.43 
Baa 0.17 0.17 2.46 79.47 7.55 2.04 1.87 1.19 5.09 
Ba 0 0.18 0.18 2.39 72.38 13.26 2.03 1.47 8.10 
B 0 0 0.14 0.41 2.71 72.9 9.76 4.88 9.21 
Caa 0 0 0 0 0.34 3.42 56.85 27.74 11.64 
Source: Moody’s Investor Service, April 2003. WR represents companies that had been rated initially but are 
not rated at year-end 
 
The next step is to transform historical default probabilities, derived from a transition 
matrix, into risk-neutral martingale probabilities in order to satisfy no-arbitrage 
conditions. This can be explained easier with an example. 
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Let’s assume we have four rating classes, A, B, C and default D. Let S01A, S01B, and S01C 
be the credit-spread, this is the difference between the yield of the risky bond and the 
yield of the risk-free bond, from time 0 to time 1 for a risky bond currently in rating 
class A, B, and C, respectively. Let’s assume S01A=0.01, S01B=0.015, and S01C=0.02, that 






Let S02A, S02B, and S02C be the credit-spread from time 0 to time 2 for a bond currently in 







Let’s further assume the one-year historical transformation matrix: 
𝑆   =   
𝐴             𝐵 𝐶       𝐷

















Though 0.7 is the probability of a bond currently rated A to stay in A; 0.2 is the 
probability of a bond currently rated B to be downgraded to C; 0.05 in the 2nd column 
and 4th row is the probability of a bond currently rated C to move to A. Let’s assume the 
risk-free continuously compounded interest rate from time 0 to time 1, r01 = 5% and the 
risk-free continuously compounded interest rate from time 0 to time 2, r02 = 6%. The 
recovery rate RR is assumed to be 40%. 
In the risk-neutral environment, we can express the risky zero-coupon bond price B at 
time t with maturity T and notional of €1 as the value of the discounted expected future 
cash-flow of 1. We discount with the risk-free interest rate r plus the swap spread s: 
 𝐵!,! = 𝐸! 𝑒!(!!,!!!!,!)!   (8) 
where Et is the risk-neutral expectation value at time t, and s is the excess yield of the 
risky asset. 
For a bond with a notional of € 1 that matures a time 1, the payoff at time 1 will be € 1 
if the bond finishes in rating A, B, or C. The payoff will be the recovery rate RR, if the 
bond defaults. Including the historical default probabilities from the transition matrix, 
we can express the bond price B at time 0 with maturity 1, which is rated A, B01A as: 
 𝐵!"! = 𝑒!(!!,!!!!,!)! ≡ 𝑒!!!" 1 1          1 𝑅𝑅




      𝐵
      𝐶
      𝐷
  (9) 
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where A → A is the historical probability of a bond in rating class A to stay in A; A → 
B is the historical probability of a bond currently in class A to move to B; and so on. 
Continuing with our example, we can state: 















= 𝑒!!.!"  × 1×0.70+ 1×0.15+ 1×0.10+ 0.5×0.05 = 0.9227 
As we can state, this result in an inequality, it is important to know that the equation (9) 
is not usually satisfied in reality. 
Now, in order to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition (9), we have to transform the 
historical transition probabilities into risk-neutral martingale probabilities, which satisfy 
the condition (9). 
In order to find the martingale probabilities λm, we have to adjust the historical 
probabilities λ with a factor η. η can be interpreted as a risk premium or risk 
adjustment. We can rewrite equation (9) for a bond currently rated in class A as: 
 
 𝐵!"! = 𝑒!(!!,!!!!,!)! ≡ 𝑒!!!" 1 1          1 𝑅𝑅




  (10) 
Generalizing the right side of the previous equation for a bond at time t with maturity T 
and solving for the risk adjustment of that bond in rating class i, ηi (we assume 
𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷 ), we get: 
 





  (11) 
where λi,D is the probability of default of a bond in rating class i. 
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One specific shortcoming of the model is that the default probability λi,D can become 
bigger than 1. This is especially the case for longer maturities T. Equation (11) can be 
reduced to: 
 





.  (12) 
 
For this equation to be smaller than 1, we require that !
!!!,!!
> 1+ 𝜆!(𝑅𝑅 − 1). This 
condition may not be satisfied for large s, T, η, and RR. 
General shortcomings of the model lie again in the fact that the ultimate reason of 
default, the asset-liability structure or the liquidity of a company, is not part of the 
analysis. Also, as in the 1995 model, the interest rate process and the bankruptcy 
process are assumed independent. Furthermore, the recovery rate RR is exogenously 
given. 
Naturally, the nature of the transition matrix also bears problems. Jarrow, Lando and 
Turnbull assume that bonds in the same credit class have the same yield spread. This is 
not necessarily the case as pointed out by (Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995). Rather, the 
rating-yield relationship is similar within sectors, which suggests conducting sector 
analysis, rather than aggregating data generally among counterparties. 
An additional problem is that ratings are often done infrequently and may not be recent 
enough to reflect current counterparty risk. In addition, Standard & Poors currently only 
rates about 1% of all companies worldwide. Nevertheless, the number of rated 
companies should increase in the future, allowing a widespread usage of the model and 
its extensions. 
 
Duffie and Singleton (1999) 
(Duffie & Singleton, 1999) express the risky bond price B at time t with maturity T 
based on equation 𝐵!,! = 𝐸! 𝑒!(!!,!!!!,!)! . In the Duffie-Singleton model, the swap 
spread St,T equals approximately 𝜆!(1− 𝑅𝑅). This result can be derived by a simple 
binomial tree for a zero-coupon bond with maturity at time 1 and a notional amount of € 
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Figure 11 Deriving the swap spread s 
 
In the last figure, r is the risk-free interest rate, s is the swap spread, λ is the hazard 
rate, which multiplied by time periods for default of 1 equals the risk-neutral probability 
of default. RR is the recovery rate. Then, we can derive: 
 𝑒!(!!!) = 𝜆𝑒!!𝑅𝑅 + (1− 𝜆)𝑒!!.  (13) 
Solving the last equation for s, using 𝑒! ≈ 1+ 𝑥, we get 𝑠 ≈ 𝜆 1− 𝑅𝑅 + 𝜆𝑟 1−
𝑅𝑅 . Duffie and Singleton prove than the term 𝜆𝑟 1− 𝑅𝑅  can be dropped for a 
continuous time setting. Hence, the interest rate process drops out and we can write for 
a default swap spread from time t to time T, St,T: 
 𝑆!,! ≈ 𝜆!,!(1− 𝑅𝑅)  (14) 
Where all variable are viewed at time t. 
The last equation shows the intuitive approximate relationship between the swap spread 
s and a hazard rate λ. If the recovery rate RR is zero, 𝑠!,! ≈ 𝜆!,!. Hence the spread s 
approximately compensates the investor for the default risk λ. The relationship in the 
equation 𝑆!,! ≈ 𝜆!,!(1− 𝑅𝑅) is often termed credit triangle, since two of the three 
variables are sufficient to generate the third. 
The model may include a liquidity premium l for the risky asset. In this case the swap 
spread is simply: 
 𝑆!,! ≈ 𝜆!,!(1− 𝑅𝑅) + l (15) 
where l is a fractional value of the risky bond. 
Duffie and Singleton show that any risky claim B with an notional amount N, for 
different interest rates r and swap spreads s at various times j, and time units of 1, with 
maturity t + τ, can be expressed as: 
 𝐵!,!!! = 𝐸! 𝑒! (!!!!!!!!!)
!!!
!!! 𝑁!!!  (16) 
Hence, one crucial finding of the Duffie-Singleton model is that any risky claim B can 
be priced by discounting the notional amount N with the default-adjusted process r+s. 
𝑒!(!!!) 
𝑅𝑅  λe-r 
1 
(1- λ)e-r 
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The equation 𝐵!,!!! = 𝐸! 𝑒! (!!!!!!!!!)
!!!
!!! 𝑁!!!   is an extension of the equation 
𝐵!,! = 𝐸! 𝑒!(!!,!!!!,!)! . 
In the last equations, the recovery rate RR is applied to the expected market value of the 
risky bond at the time of default, termed recovery of market value RMV, 
hence  𝐸! 𝑅𝑀𝑉!!! = 𝑅𝑅!𝐸! 𝐵!!! , where d+1 is the time of default. In contrast, in 
the Jarrow-Turnbull 1995 and Jarrow-Lando-Turnbull 1997 model, the recovery value 
is a fraction of the risk-free bond price at the time of default. Brennan-Schwartz (1980), 
Longstaff-Schwartz (1995), and Duffie (1998) apply a simpler assumption with respect 
to the payoff in default. They assume that creditors at the time of default receive the 
recovery rate multiplied with the notional amount of the risky bond. 
 
O’Kane and Turnbull (2003) 
(O' Kane & Turnbull, 2003) presents in their paper a market standard pricing model. 
Their approach is based on the work of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), who characterized 
a credit event as the first event of a Poisson counting process which occurs at some time 
τ  with a probability defined as: 
 𝑃𝑟 𝜏 < 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡|𝜏 ≥ 𝑡 = 𝜆 𝑡 𝑑𝑡  (17) 
ie, the probability of a default occurring within the time interval 𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡  conditional 
on surviving to time t, is proportional to sometime dependent function λ(t), known as 
the hazard rate, and the length of the time interval dt. We can therefore think of 
modelling default in a one-period setting as a simple binomial tree in which we survive 
with probability 1-λ(t)dt, or default and receive a recovery value R with probability 
λ(t)dt. O’ Kane and Turnbull make the simplifying assumption that the hazard rate 
process is deterministic. By extension, their assumption also implies that the hazard rate 
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Figure 12 The equivalent of a binomial tree in the modelling of default in which the tree terminates and makes 
a payment K at default 
 
Extending this model to continuous time survival probability to time T conditional on 
surviving to valuation time, 𝑡! , by considering the limit dsè0. 
Survival probability can be shown as 




This model is used to value both the premium and protection legs, and then the 
breakeven spread of a default swap. With this model, we can get the implied term 
structure of arbitrage-free survival probabilities from market spreads. 
In order to value the premium leg, this is the series of payments of the default swap 
spread made to maturity or to the time of the credit event, which occurs first, and 
ignoring the accrued premium payment from the previous premium payment date until 
the time of the credit event, the present value of the premium leg can be written as: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚  𝐿𝑒𝑔  𝑃𝑉 𝑡! , 𝑡! = 𝑆 𝑡!, 𝑡! Δ!!!! 𝑡!!!, 𝑡!,𝐵 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑡! 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡! . (19) 
where there are n=1,…,N contractual payment dates t1,…,tN and tN is the maturity date 
of the default swap, with the spread 𝑆 𝑡!, 𝑡!  between today and the maturity date. 
∆ 𝑡!!!, 𝑡!,𝐵  is the day count fraction between premium dates tn-1 and tn in the 
appropriate basis convention denoted by B. 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡!  is the arbitrage-free survival 
probability of the reference entity from the valuation time tv to premium payment time 
tn. 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑡!  is the Libor discount factor from valuation date to premium payment date n.  
In order to include the effect of premium accrued, we have to work out the expected 
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between two premium dates, and calculating the probability weighted accrued premium 
payment, resulting in the following expression for the premium leg: 




!!! 𝑡!!!, 𝑠,𝐵 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑠 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑠 𝜆 𝑠 𝑑𝑠. (20) 
This integral makes complicated expression to evaluate exactly. Though, as 
demonstrated by O’ Kane and Turnbull, it is possible to approximate this equation with 
 ! !!,!!
!
Δ!!!! 𝑡!!!, 𝑡!,𝐵 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑡! 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡!!! − 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡!  (21) 
by noting that if a default does occur between two premium dates, the average accrued 
premium is half the full premium due to be paid at the end of the premium period. The 
full value of the premium leg is then given by 
 𝑆 𝑡!, 𝑡! ×𝑅𝑃𝑉01 (22) 
where RPV01 is the risky PV01 defined as 
 𝑅𝑃𝑉01 = Δ!!!! 𝑡!!!, 𝑡!,𝐵 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑡! 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡! +
!!"
!
𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡!!! − 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑡! (23) 
where 1PA=1 if the contract specifies premium accrued (PA) and 0 otherwise. 
The effect of premium accrued on the spread can be very well approximated by 
𝑆!
2 1− 𝑅 𝑓 
The protection leg is the contingent payment of (100%-R) on the face value of the 
protection made following the credit event. R is the expected recovery rate. In pricing 
the protection leg, it is important to take into account the timing of the credit event, 
because this can have a significant effect on the present value of the protection leg – 
especially for longer maturity default swaps. Within the hazard rate approach we can 
solve this timing problem by conditioning on each small time interval 𝑠, 𝑠 + 𝑑𝑠  
between time tv and tN at which the credit event can occur. The expected present value 
of the recovery payment is: 




where, R is the expected recovery price of the cheapest to deliver asset at the time of the 
credit event, 𝑄 𝑡! , 𝑠  is the probability of surviving to some future time s. 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑠  is the 
risk free rate between today and the future time s, and 𝜆 𝑠 𝑑𝑠 is the probability of a 
credit event in the next small time increment ds. 
From now on, it is possible to get the survival probabilities from the market quoted 
default swap spread, through  
PV of Premium Leg = PV of the Protection Leg 
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Other significant reduced form models that have received recognition are Brennan-
Schwartz (1980); Iben-Litterman (1991); Longstaff-Schwartz (1995); Das-Tufano 
(1996); Duffee (1996); Schoenbucher (1997); Henn (1997); Brooks-Yan (1998); 
Madan-Unal (1998); Duffee (1998); Das-Sundaram (2000); Hull and White (2000); 
Hull and White (2001); Wei (2001); Duffie-Lando (2001); and Jarrow-Yildirim (2002); 
Martin, Thompson and Browne (2003) 
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Analysis Framework 
Credit Default Swaps in numbers 
In 1998, International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA®) facilitated the CDS 
trading, through standard documentation and procedures, allowing credit risks to be 
traded and managed in much the same way as market risks. In 2009, the market saw a 
“Big Bang” for CDS contracts and the way in which they are traded, including 
important convention changes in order to make CDS more standardised to help support 
efforts for central clearing of CDS trades. 
According to the ISDA® market survey, the notional amount outstanding of CDS had an 
outstanding expansion in the last decade, rising from US$920 billion at 2001 to 
US$62.2 trillion at 2007. This breakthrough growth was interrupted by a financial 
turmoil starting in 2007, caused by a subprime mortgage crisis, and then by the Lehman 
and Brothers, AIG and Bern and Stearns bankruptcy, downing to US$26.3 trillion at 
mid-year 2010, a decrease of 57.8% from year-end 2007.  
As in past surveys held by ISDA®, the US$26.3 trillion notional amount was 
approximately evenly divided between bought and sold protection: bought protection 
notional amount was approximately US$13.3 trillion and sold protection was about 
US$13.0 trillion, with a net bought notional amount of US$359.0 billion, representing 
5.6% of the total derivatives reported to the ISDA® Market Survey. 
 
Figure 13 Outstanding Credit Default Swaps. Notional amounts in billions of US dollars, adjusted for double 
counting 
 
                       Source: ISDA® Market Survey  
 
According to ISDA® CDS Marketplace™, in May 5th 2012 the total par amount of 
credit protection bought or sold was around US$14.9 trillion, 81% was related to 
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corporates and the rest to sovereigns. More than 91% of this amount, mentioned as 
gross notional value in ISDA® studies was concentrated in Europe and America.  
It is important to refer the overall amount of credit risk in the financial system does not 
increase with this significant size of the credit derivatives market, because every credit 
derivative contract has a buyer and a seller of the credit risk and so there is no net 
increase of credit risk. In some situations credit derivatives can increase the amount of 
credit risk in the capital markets, due to the counterparty credit risk associated with 
each contract. This is the risk that the protection seller does not pay the compensation in 
case of default to the protection buyer. 
The equivalence relation between CDS and bond yields 
In our study, we will use the reduced-form hence it offers a suitable framework to 
connect bond spreads with CDS premia. Using the risk neutral default probability and 
no-arbitrage conditions, it is direct to establish the parity link between the two spreads, 
which will be used as the testable hypothesis in the empirical part of the thesis. 
This framework, initially developed by (Duffie, Credit swap valuation, 1999), is 
simplified by assuming that the risk-free rate (r) is constant over time. The protection 
buyer of a CDS must pay a constant premium (s) until the contract matures or a credit 
event occurs to the protection seller. If a credit event does occur, the protection buyer 
receives the difference between the cheapest-do-deliver bond and the face value, and 
must pay accrued CDS premium upon default. For simplicity, we will assume the 
recovery value as the difference between the par value and the market value and there is 
no accrued premium after default. 
Assuming no-arbitrage conditions, we can replicate synthetically the acquisition of a 
CDS through shorting a par fixed coupon bond, with a coupon rate of (c) on the same 
reference entity with the same maturity date, and investing the proceeds in a par fixed 
coupon risk-free bond. Therefore, the CDS premium should be equal to the credit 
spread of the par fixed coupon bond. That is, 
 s = c – r  (25) 
If this parity relationship is violated, the arbitrageur can take profits. This is, if s > c – r, 
an investor can sell the CDS in the derivatives market, buy a risk-free bond and sell the 
bond of the reference company in the cash market, resulting in arbitrage returns.  
If s < c – r, the investor can implement the reverse strategy in order to collect profits. 
Meanwhile, this equilibrium may not hold, because some of the key assumptions may 
not be satisfied in practice. First, the protection buyer normally needs to pay the accrued 
premium when the credit event occurs, making the CDS premium to be smaller after 
taking into the account of this accrued payment. Second, the existence of the cheapest-
to-deliver option, hence the majority of the CDS contracts are settle via physical 
delivery, resulting in an increase of the CDS premia. Third, the definition of credit 
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event is not unanimous, making harder the valuation of a credit event. Fourth, there is 
no initial exchange of cash-flows in a CDS transaction, in contrast to the bond market. 
This difference could cause the CDS market to respond faster than the bond market to 
changes in the underlying credit risk, generating price discrepancies in the short run. 
Fifth, short-sale of corporate bonds is practically not allowed, making difficult to gain 
from the price difference when the CDS premium is higher than the bond spread. This 
asymmetry may have important implications for the credit spreads adjustment 
dynamics. Sixth, transaction costs will reduce the number of arbitrage opportunities 
between the two markets. Lastly, the two spreads may be influenced differently by other 
factors than credit risk, such as liquidity and/or counterparty risk. 
Consequently, in our study we will assume that: 
1. Market participants can short single name corporate bonds. This means that 
bond holders can sell bonds, buy riskless bonds and sell default protection when 
s > c – r; 
2. Market participants can short riskless bonds. This is equivalent to assuming that 
market participants can borrow at the risk free rate; 
3. We ignore the cheapest-to-deliver bond option in a CDS; 
4. There is no counterparty default risk in a CDS; 
5. The circumstances under which the CDS pays off are those defined by ISDA®; 
6. We ignore that there may be tax and liquidity reasons that cause investors to 
prefer a riskless bond to a corporate bond plus a CDS or vice versa; 
7. CDS gives the holder the right to sell a bond for its face value; 
8. We ignore transaction costs. 
 
Estimation of risk-neutral default probabilities from CDS spreads 
As we state previously, we will use the reduced form to modelling credit events and 
estimate our risk-neutral default probabilities from CDS spreads through optimization 
algorithm, based on the work of (Martin, Thompson, & Browne, 2001). Thus, we will 
assume the default process to follow an non-homogeneous Poisson process and as such 
for any 0 ≤ τ ≤ T the default time t and default intensity λ(t) satisfy 
 𝑄! 𝑡 =   ℙ 𝜏 > 𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝜆 𝑢 d𝑢
!
!  (26) 
where ℙ is the risk-neutral probability and T is the final maturity. The single name 
survival probabilities ℙ (τ > t ) are usually implied from the CDS market. 
The fair CDS spread balances the present value of the contingent leg C, given by 
 𝐶 = 𝑁(1− 𝑅) 𝑑(𝑡!)(𝑄! 𝑡!!! − 𝑄! 𝑡! )!!!!  (27) 
and the present values of the fee leg F is given by 
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 𝐹 = 𝑁𝑆 𝑄! 𝑡! 𝑑 𝑡! 𝛥𝑡! + 𝐴!)!!!!  (28) 




𝑁𝑑(𝑡!)(𝑄! 𝑡!!! − 𝑄! 𝑡! )𝛥𝑡!!!!! . (29) 
In these equations the summations run over the payment dates, N is the notional, S is the 
spread premium on a yearly basis, paid quarterly, Qs(ti) is the survival probability at 
time ti, R is the recovery rate, d(t) is the risk-free discount factor and Δt is the fraction of 
the year, corresponding to Δti = ti - ti-1 an Actual/360 day counter. The standard maturity 
dates on corporate CDS contract are the 20th of March, June, September and December. 
The fee leg can be written as 
 F = NSB, (30) 
where B = BVP(0, T) is the present value of 1 basis point (bp) paid from time zero until 
maturity, T. It is given by 
 𝐵𝑉𝑃 0,𝑇 = 𝑄! 𝑡! 𝑑 𝑡! 𝛥𝑡!!!!! +
!
!
𝑁!"#𝑑(𝑡!)(𝑄! 𝑡!!! − 𝑄! 𝑡! )𝛥𝑡!!!!! . (31) 
At this time we can determine the survival probability in (5) from the observed CDS 
market quotes, through the optimization method to determine all the probabilities of 
default simultaneously. At a start of a CDS in non-arbitrage equivalence, both sides, the 
fee and the contingent legs, must be equal and from (6) and (7) we have that the spread 
at time zero is assumed by 
 𝑆 = (!!!) !(!!)(!! !!!! !!! !! )
!
!!!
!! !! ! !! !!!!!!!!!!
 (32) 
At beginning all CDS quotes follows (11) for all maturities, therefore in an optimization 
process the set of survival probabilities at each point in time is bound such that the error 
in recovering the observed CDS quotes is minimized and probabilities are constrained 
between zero and one. Assuming Y [QS(t1), QS(t2),…, QS(tn)] is a possible set of survival 
probabilities, Si are the market CDS spreads at time zero with maturity Ti, Zi is the value 
of spread using Y. The objective function T [QS(t1), QS(t2),…, QS(tn)] to be minimized is 
given by 





+ 𝜇 𝑑! 𝑞!!!, 𝑞!!!!!!!!!!! , (33) 
where d(qi,qi+1) is a probability distance measure given by 
 𝑑 𝑞!!!, 𝑞! = 𝑞!!! − 𝑞! 𝑙𝑛
!!!!
!!  




The weights σi adjusts the importance given to the different quotes when implying the 
probabilities and the parameter µ controls the importance of the continuity part of the 
error function. In our study, we will follow the (Martin, Thompson, & Browne, 2001) 
suggestion and use µ = 10, which gives a very good fit of the market data, and fix the 
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five and then year contracts to σi to 10-2 and the three and seven year contracts we will 
fix σi to 10-4, hence the five and ten year contracts have usually been more liquid than 
the three and seven year contracts. The 𝑑 𝑞!!!, 𝑞!  is an entropic distance measure that 
assures smoothness between two adjacent points in time of the probability distribution. 
In practice, when a probability moves close to zero or one, the parameter d will increase 
guaranteeing that the probabilities stay constrained. 
Building a hazard rate term structure 
The standard modelling assumption used in the credit default swap market is to assume 
that the hazard rate is a piecewise flat function of maturity time. This is an entirely 
reasonable assumption because, given only one data point, it is not possible to extract 
more than one piece of information about the term structure of hazard rates. 
Given 1Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y default swap spread values, we would assume that we 
have a hazard rate term structure with five sections λ0,1, λ1,3, λ3,5, λ5,7 and λ7,10. The 
process of constructing the term structure of hazard rates is the bootstrapping method. It 
starts with taking the shortest maturity contract and using it to calculate the first survival 
probability. In this case, the 1Y default swap has to be used to calculate the value λ0,1. 
Assuming a quarterly premium payment frequency, using a value of M=12, and 
assuming that premium accrued is not paid, this is achieved by solving  
 ! !!,!!!!!
!!!
Δ 𝑡!!!, 𝑡!,𝐵 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑡! 𝑒!!!,!!! = 𝑍 𝑡! , 𝑡!!"!!!!!!,!,!,!" (𝑒!!!,!!!!! −
𝑒!!!,!!!)  (35) 
 
This equation can be solved using a one-dimensional root-searching algorithm5. This 
procedure is then repeated to solve for λ1,3 and so on until the final maturity default 
swap is reached. Beyond this, it is often assumed that the hazard rate is flat. Defining 
τ=T-tv, we have: 
𝑄 𝑡! − 𝑇 =
exp −𝜆!,!𝜏                                                                                                                      𝑖𝑓  0 < 𝜏 ≤ 1
exp  (−λ!,!𝜏 − λ!,!(𝜏 − 1))                                                                   𝑖𝑓  1 < 𝜏 ≤ 3
exp  (−λ!,!𝜏 − 2λ!,! − λ!,!(𝜏 − 3))                                     𝑖𝑓  3 < 𝜏 ≤ 5
exp −𝜆!,!𝜏 − 2𝜆!,!−2𝜆!,! − 𝜆!,! 𝜏 − 5          𝑖𝑓  5 < 𝜏 ≤ 7
exp  (−λ!,!𝜏 − 2λ!,!−2λ!,! − 2λ!,! − λ!,!"(𝜏 − 7)) 𝜏 > 7
 
 
The second approach uses an optimization algorithm to determine all the probabilities at 
the same time. (Martin, Thompson, & Browne, 2001) present an algorithm for the 
                                                
5 Bisection or gradient-based methods such as Newton-Raphson. This method is used 
for finding successively better approximations to the roots. 
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optimization, that assumes the absence of arbitrage at the start of a CDS, which means 
that both sides, the premium leg and protection leg must be equal, this means, that the 
spread at time zero is given by: 
 𝑆 𝑡! , 𝑡! + 1𝑌 = (1− 𝑅)
! !!,!! (!!!!,!!!!!!!!!!,!!!)!"!!!
! !!!!,!!,! ! !!,!! !!!!,!!!!!!,!,!,!"
  (36) 
We consider there are CDS quotes associated with several maturities, with several 
maturities, for instance 3, 5, 7 and 10-year maturities. 
In an optimization algorithm the set of survival probabilities at each point in time is 
determined such that the error in recovering the observed CDS quoted is minimized, 
with probabilities constrained between 0 and 1. 
With our example, for 1Y, 3Y, 5Y, 7Y and 10Y default swap spread values, we would 
assume that we have a possible set of hazard rates Y [λ0,1, λ1,3, λ3,5, λ5,7 and λ7,10]. Si are 
the market CDS rates at time zero with maturity tN. Zi is the value of the spread using Y. 
The objective function T [λ0,1, λ1,3, λ3,5, λ5,7 and λ7,10] will be minimized with: 






+ 𝜇 𝑑!(𝑝!!!,𝑝!)!!!!!! .!!!!   (37) 
 
where 𝑑(𝑝!!!,𝑝!) is a probability distance measure given by: 
 𝑑 𝑝!!!,𝑝! = (𝑝!!! − 𝑝!)𝑙𝑛
!!!!
!!
+ (𝑝! − 𝑝!!!)𝑙𝑛
!!!!!!
!!!!
  (38) 
The weights 𝜎! serve to adjust the importance given to the diferente quotes when 
implying the probabilities, because some contracts are more liquid than others. The 
𝑑 𝑝!!!,𝑝!  serves to guarantee the smoothness betweem two adjacent points in time of 
the probability distribution. The importance of the continuity part of the error function is 
controlled via the parameter µ. 
Equating both methods we can say that the bootstrap is easier to implement when 
comparing with the optimization method, meanwhile it has their drawbacks. In the 
bootstrap method, if there is any unreliable quote due to illiquidity, any mistakes on the 
determination of the short-term probabilities are propagated to the subsequent ones. 
Additionally, depending on the form of the CDS curve, one may come up with negative 
probabilities. 
Regarding the optimization method, the algorithm searches for the distribution of 
probabilities that minimize CDS errors and observe some constrains, for example that 
probabilities remain positive and smooth. It can also control which quotes are reliable 
and which are not. In our study, we use the optimization method. 
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Estimation of the risk-free rates using German Treasuries 
Choosing the risk-free rate may not be a simple task. Bond traders tend to regard the 
Treasury zero curve as the risk-free zero curve. By contrast, derivatives traders working 
for large financial institutions tend to use the swap zero curve (sometimes also called 
the LIBOR zero curve) as the risk-free zero curve in their pricing models because they 
consider LIBOR/swap rates to correspond closely to their opportunity cost of capital. 
The choice of the Treasury zero curve as the risk-free zero curve is based on the 
argument that a bond issued by a government in its own currency has no credit risk so 
that its yield should equal the risk-free rate of interest. However, there are many other 
factors such as liquidity, taxation and regulation that can affect the yield on a bond. For 
example, the yields on German Treasury bonds tend to be much lower than the yields on 
other instruments that have very low credit risk. One reason for this is that Treasury 
bonds have to be used by financial institutions to fulfil a variety of regulatory 
requirements. A second reason is that the amount of capital a financial institution is 
required to hold to support an investment in Treasury bonds is substantially smaller than 
the capital required supporting a similar investment in low risk corporate bonds. A third 
reason is that the interest on Treasury bonds is not taxed at the state level whereas the 
interest on other fixed income investments is taxed at this level. For all of these non-
credit-risk reasons, the yields on German Treasury bonds tend to be depressed relative 
to the yields on other low risk bonds. 
Thus, since zero-coupon rates are rarely directly observable, they have to be estimated 
from market data. In this thesis we used the parametric term structure estimation 
method, the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model. 
Calculating the basis 
The CDS basis is the difference between the CDS spread (derivative market) and the 
asset swap spread (cash market) of the same reference asset and in theory should be 
zero.  
 Basisi,n = CDS spreadi,n – ASW spreadi, n (39) 
where i is the reference underline and n is the period. 
 
The basis is positive when CDS is higher than ASW spread, and negative when ASW 
spread is higher than CDS. The difference between both spreads happens because of 
funding and optionality6. 
Usually, the basis is positive, but after the subprime crisis, we have assisted to a 
generally negative basis for the major names due to this funding crisis. 
                                                
6 Cadete, Joaquim, 2012. Master in Finance Lectures, Session 2 slides. 
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Imagine that one investor takes on credit risk and gets paid the default swap spread “D”: 
Figure 14 Price of credit risk in the default swap market 
 
 
We can replicate the CDS in the asset swap market. 
Figure 15 Replication of the CDS in the asset swap market 
 
Netting out the cash-flows, shows that the investor is paid (S-X) bps for taking on the 
bonds credit risk. If Libor flat funding is assumed (i.e. X=0), then the asset swap spread 
is a close proxy for the default swap spread. 
Most corporate bonds fund below Libor, X is negative. The breakeven default swap 
spread then becomes: 
 Default Swap Spread ≈ Asset Swap Spread + Funding Cost (40) 
 
In addition, the protection seller has sold a number of options to the protection buyer 
and will need to be compensated for it with a wider default swap spread: 
Default Swap Spread = Asset Swap Spread + Funding Cost + Optionality Cost (41) 
Several factors can increase or decrease the basis, namely:  
Factors that increase the basis: 
− Natural market: The default swap market has grown into the natural market to 
hedge credit risk, especially for 3- to 5-year maturities many credit hedgers use 
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the liquid default swap market rather than the asset swap market, driving default 
premiums up; 
− Convertible bond arbitrage: Hedge funds and other financial institutions strip 
the credit risk from the convertible bond and hedge it with default swaps to 
concentrate on managing the equity option; 
− The delivery option: In a default swap the delivery option allows the protection 
buyer to choose delivery from a pre-defined pool of assets, which increases de 
value of default swaps compared to asset swaps; 
− Default criteria: Default criteria are clearly defined by ISDA®, which facilitate 
trading. Also, default swap payments may be triggered by events, which do not 
constitute default in the cash market. 
Factors that decrease the basis: 
− Counterparty risk: The default swap buyer is exposed to higher counterparty 
credit risk than the asset swap payer, since in an asset swap two cash-flows of 
similar value are exchanged on a regular basis; 
− Marking-to-market in default: In case of default, it is typically quite difficult to 
mark-to-market an asset swap. Default swaps are designed to function in a 
default, so their marking-to-market is typically easier to achieve. This might 
drive asset swap spreads up, since the asset swap fixed rate payer, who will 
suffer a financial loss in the event of default, might want to be compensated for 
the higher uncertainty with receiving a higher spread. 
In order to determine the ASW in our study, whenever possible, we have selected bonds 
with expected life between 4 and 6 years, hence the basis tend to zero when maturity 
approximates. 
In order to match life of both CDS and ASW spread, the ASW spread of each single-
name was found through the cubic splines interpolation. 
Finally, when quotes where not available, we used the last available price, because we 
assumed that there was no new information that could influence the price. 
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Determinants of basis spreads 
Besides (Zhu, 2006), the most relevant literature along this matter are (Blanco, Brennan, 
& Marsh, 2005) and (Longstaff, Mithal, & Neis, 2005). (Blanco, Brennan, & Marsh, 
2005) show that for most entities, the parity relationship between the two credit spreads 
holds on average over time, but extensive differences can arise in the short run either, 
because of inadequacies in contract terms or due to a clear lead for CDS premia over 
bond spreads. (Longstaff, Mithal, & Neis, 2005) uses weekly data and find that price 
discrepancies between bond spreads and CDS prices can be largely explained by 
measures of individual corporate bond illiquidity. (Cossin & Hricko, 2001) shows that 
the determinants of CDS premia are quite similar to those of bond spreads, including 
ratings, yield curves, stock prices and leverage ratios. (Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004) 
and (Houwelling & Vorst, 2005) compare the pricing of credit risk between the CDS 
market and the bond market, they also suggest that, when using swap rates as 
benchmark risk-free rates, the price differences between bond spreads and CDS premia 
are quite small, around 10 basis points. (Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004) and (Norden & 
Weber, 2004) find robust evidence that the CDS market anticipates credit rating 
announcements, particularly negative rating events. 
According to (Zhu, 2006), price differences between the money market and the 
derivatives market are very small on average over time, there is substantial variation 
over time and cross entities, that could be explained by the reasons described previously 
in the section “The equivalence relation between CDS and bond yields”. We will use 
the regression technique to investigate the determinants of basis spread movements: The 
explanatory variables include: 
• Ratings and rating events. (Houwelling & Vorst, 2005) suggest that the price 
discrepancy could be different for high-grade and low-grade bond issues. 
Intuitively, a same level of absolute price differential is proportionally less 
important for low-grade bond issuers, because the credit spread is higher. In this 
study we include the time series of the Standard & Poors (S&P) rating for each 
single name. The rating categories AAA, AA+, AA,…,CCC+ are transformed 
into the numbers 1,2,3,…,17. Another issue of interest is whether the bond 
market and the CDS market have different predicting power over future rating 
events. (Hull, et al., 2004) and (Norden & Weber, 2004) pointed out that the 
derivatives market tends to anticipate future rating events, especially between 
the 90th and the 60th day before of a rating downgrade or upgrade event, and 
during the 10 days after the credit event, bond spreads increase or decrease more 
substantially, offsetting the price discrepancies accumulated before (Zhu, 2006). 
This implies that the derivatives market does a better job in incorporating future 
rating events into the price. To examine this issue, we include five dummy 
variables, following (Hull, et al., 2004), that can capture the impact of rating 
actions: DUMB6190, DUMB3160 and DUMB0130 represent a rating event 
occurring on future days [t + 61, t + 90], [t + 31, t + 60] and [t + 61, t + 90], 
respectively. DUMA0110 and DUMA1130 represent a past rating event during [t 
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– 1, t - 10] and [t – 11, t - 30]. In each of the dummy variables a value of 1 refers 
to a downgrade of the rating, -1 to an upgrading and 0 to no action; 
• The CDS Big Bang event. In April 08 2009, we assisted to the introduction of 
new forms of CDS contracts, expressed as upfront payments plus fixed coupon. 
In order to capture and analyse the impact of this event we create a dummy 
variable: DUMBIG. The value of 1 refers to after the event and 0 to before. 
• The Lehman & Brothers Bailout. In September 15 2008, we assisted to the 
Lehman & Brothers bailout. This event had impact in all names. In order to 
capture and analyse the impact of this event we create a dummy variable: 
DUMLEHMAN. The value of 1 refers to after the event and 0 to before. 
• Liquidity. Both CDS premia and bond spreads may be influenced by factors 
unrelated to the underlying credit risk. We use the bid-ask spread of CDS-5 year 
contract differential to represent the relative liquidity between the two 
instruments. To be more specific, this measure is defined as the average bid-ask 
spread in the CDS market in the past 20 business days. 
• Macroeconomic conditions. To test the pricing accuracy, we will include one 
macro-financial variable. Regional stock market index (EURO STOXX 50 in 
Europe), because this variable reflects the performance of the macroeconomy 
and thus have an impact on the pricing of credit risk. However, if both markets 
are equally efficient in pricing the changes in macro-financial conditions, their 
impact on basis spreads should be zero. 
Our study differs slightly from Zhu work hence we do not test the lagged basis spreads 
and changes in credit spreads as determinants. Meanwhile, we introduce two new 
variables, the Big Bang Event and Lehman and Brothers Event, as possible determinants 
of basis spreads. 
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Data set 
The period of analysis is from 1 January 2007 to 30 November 2012. We first group the 
quotes by the characteristics of reference entities, including company names, currency 
of denomination, maturity and seniority, treating different currency denominated bonds 
as two distinct entities. The following two filtering criteria are then used: (i) the entity is 
a bank, a corporate or a sovereign; (ii) there are at least 150 days with valid quotes for 
the contract during the period of analysis; (iii) we choose only denominations in US 
dollars (USD) or euros (Eur). The filtering leaves 96 entities to start with. We then 
construct the time series of daily CDS quotes for those entities, which are defined as the 
middle point of average bid and average offer on each day. 
For each of the chosen reference entities, we retrieve the information for all bonds 
outstanding during the analysis period. In order to avoid measurement errors caused by 
various options in corporate bonds, we choose only bond issues that satisfy the 
following restrictions: (i) bonds must not be puttable, callable, convertible or reverse 
convertible; (ii) bonds must be denominated in the same currency as the CDS contract; 
(iii) bonds must not be subordinated, structured or company guaranteed; (iv) the coupon 
payments must be fixed-term. 
Then, we selected one company per activity sector (10), mainly German, which led to 
the following subset of companies: 
 
Figure 16 Analysed companies 
Company name Sector 
Bayer AG  Basic Materials 
Deutsche Telekom AG  Communications 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG  Consumer Cyclical 
Unilever NV  Consumer Non-cyclical 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA  Diversified 
Total SA  Energy 
Deutsche Bank AG  Senior 
HeidelbergCement AG  Industrial 
STMicroelectronics NV  Technology 
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Next for each name, we got the bond issues and respective information in order to 
obtain the ASW spread. 
For the companies analysed, we have selected the following tickers (corporate bond 
issuances): 
 
Figure 17 Bond issues analysed  
Company name Period of 
analysis 
Ticker Issue Date Maturity 
Bayer AG 2007..2012 EF433718 Corp 23-05-2006 23-05-2013 
Deutsche Telekom AG 2010..2012 EC918126 Corp 01-04-2003 29-03-2018 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 2007..2009 EF385422 Corp 04-05-2006 06-05-2013 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 2010..2012 EH890127 Corp 07-07-2009 07-07-2016 
Unilever NV 2007..2012 EF101824 Corp 29-09-2005 29-09-2015 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA 2007..2008 ED9733749 Corp 22-06-2005 22-06-2012 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA 2009..2012 EH881133 Corp 29-06-2009 29-06-2017 
Total SA 2007..2012 EG476311 Corp 06-06-2007 06-06-2017 
Total SA 2007..2012 EC2983939 Corp 24-10-2000 24-10-2010 
Allianz SE 2007..2012 ED256184 Corp 11-12-2003 11-12-2013 
Allianz SE 2007..2012 EH675203 Corp 16-12-2008 17-12-2018 
HeidelbergCement AG 2007..2012 EG911261 Corp 22-10-2007 04-01-2018 
HeidelbergCement AG 2007..2012 EC116528 Corp 09-04-1999 09-04-2009 
STMicroelectronics NV 2007..2012 ED083495 Corp 05-08-2003 05-07-2013 
E.ON AG 2007..2012 EC570562 Corp 29-05-2002 07-06-2032 
 
Lastly, we only analysed companies that had more than 150 daily quotes, in order to 
compute the ASW. The resulted companies were: 
- Bayer AG 
- Deutsche Telekom AG 
- Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
- Unilever NV 
- LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA 
- Total SA 
- E.ON. AG. 
Finally, we decided to focus on the period between June, 18th 2008 till December, 31st 
2012, because during this period, we had CDS quotes for all maturities, this is 6 months, 
1-year, 2-years, 3-years, 4-years, 5-years, 7-years and 10-years. This is essential to 
retrieve the hazard rates from daily CDS curves, through optimization process described 
early. All information regarding CDS spreads, bond information and ASW spread were 
obtained from Bloomberg. 
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Empirical analysis: The determinants of the basis between CDS and 
ASW spread 
As we explain earlier, we will use 9 variables as determinants of the basis. The expected 
sign of each variable is resumed as follows: 
Figure 18 Expected sign of variables 






DUMA3160 [t+61,90] (-) 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] (-) 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] (-) 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] (-) 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] (-) 
 
All above variables are compiled into the following regression model: 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠!,! =   𝛽!,!,! + 𝛽!,!𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐼𝐺𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽!,!𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐿𝐸𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽!,!𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑋𝑋!
+ 𝛽!,!SPREADS5Y!,! + 𝛽!,!DUMA3160  [t+ 61,90]!,!
+ 𝛽!,!DUMA3160  [t+ 31,60]!,! + 𝛽!,!DUMA030  [t+ 1,30]!,!
+ 𝛽!,!DUMB0110  [t− 1, t− 10]!,! + 𝛽!,!DUMB1130  [t− 1, t− 30]!,!
+ 𝜀!,! 
where, i is the company and n is the daily quote. 
Note that we can only compare liquidity, rating and macroeconomic factors with Zhu’s 
work. And as we can see, we cannot conclude that credit factors plays an important role 
in determining basis spreads, like Zhu paper did, hence for some of the analysed 
companies, we did not observed credit events (e.g. Bayer AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, 
Unilever NV and Total SA) and for the rest of the companies we got consistently P-
values higher than 1%, meaning that we will fail to reject the null hypothesis, this is that 
dependent variable can contribute for the determination of the basis. 
All companies in the sample for period the period between June 18 2008 and December 
31 2012 have 1658 observations. The F-statistic, shown in appendix 1.1 for all 
companies, shows that the coefficients are jointly significant. No problems with 
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Figure 19 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – Bayer AG 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG 93.51 0.00% 
DUMLEHMAN (78.59) 0.00% 
EUROSTOXX50 (1.96) 0.00% 
SPREADS5Y (10.85) 0.00% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] 0.00 n.a. 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] 0.00 n.a. 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] 0.00 n.a. 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 0.00 n.a. 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] 0.00 n.a. 
 
Figure 20 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – Deutsche Telekom AG 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG (35.82) 0.00% 
DUMLEHMAN (30.93) 0.00% 
EUROSTOXX50 (0.11) 29.56% 
SPREADS5Y (12.76) 0.00% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] 0 n.a. 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] 0 n.a. 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] 0 n.a. 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 0 n.a. 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] 0 n.a. 
 
Figure 21 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG 132.80 0.00% 
DUMLEHMAN (126.22) 0.00% 
EUROSTOXX50 (1.15) 0.00% 
SPREADS5Y (2.88) 0.00% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] (84.89) 0.00% 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] 5.34 62.52% 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] (3.89) 72.03% 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 2.61 87.37% 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] 88.09 0.00% 
 
Figure 22 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – Unilever N.V. 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG (67.98)    0.00% 
DUMLEHMAN (60.74)    0.00% 
EUROSTOXX50 (0.37)    0.00% 
SPREADS5Y (2.19)    0.01% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] 0 n.a. 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] 0 n.a. 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] 0 n.a. 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 0 n.a. 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] 0 n.a. 
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Figure 23 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton SA 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG 86.31 0.0% 
DUMLEHMAN (92.77) 0.0% 
EUROSTOXX50 (0.99) 0.0% 
SPREADS5Y (4.69) 0.0% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] 1.40 83.3% 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] 1.02 90.9% 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] (0.83) 92.5% 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 2.85 83.1% 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] (16.02) 3.9% 
 
Figure 24 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – Total SA 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG (6.56)    1.39% 
DUMLEHMAN (6.90)    12.89% 
EUROSTOXX50 (0.07)    46.18% 
SPREADS5Y (10.93)    0.00% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] 0 n.a. 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] 0 n.a. 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] 0 n.a. 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 0 n.a. 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] 0 n.a. 
 
Figure 25 The determinants of the basis between CDS spread and ASW spread – E.ON AG 
Dependent variables Coef P value 
DUMBIGBANG 0.10 0.00% 
DUMLEHMAN 39.49 44.25% 
EUROSTOXX50 (0.11) 0.00% 
SPREADS5Y (7,65) 0.00% 
DUMA3160 [t+61,90] (19,97) 2.33% 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60] (7,68) 11.67% 
DUMA030 [t+1,30] 7,01 17.52% 
DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] 5.13 48.21% 
DUMB1130 [t-1,t-30] 15.02 31.32% 
 
The average R2 for the period is 49,77% being lowest for Total (27.94%) and highest 
for Bayer AG (67.69%). This average R2 is also reflected in part for having good 
coefficients for DIMBIGBANG and DUMLEHMAN variables. 
Of the global variables DUMBIGBANG is significant for all companies, even for Total 
SA, that have a P-value slightly higher than 1%. Meanwhile, not all companies in the 
sample had a positive coefficient as expected, Deutsche Telekom AG, Unilever NV and 
Total SA had negative coefficients. For the rest of the companies that had positive 
coefficients, this reflects the expected, this is the Big Bang event contribute to risk 
mitigation (counterparty risk), hence after the event the basis had averagely get 
narrower. The DUMLEHMAN variable was significant and had negative coefficient for 
Bayer AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Unilever NV and LVMH 
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SA, as predicted. This means that after Lehman and Brothers event, the basis for these 
companies had wider, this was the result of the credit crisis confidence after the 
respective bailout. For Total SA and E.ON AG we cannot conclude, because we have 
reject the variables hence the P-value is quite larger than 1%.  
Like Zhu work, we have also confirm that both markets are quasi-equally efficient in 
pricing the changes in macro-financial conditions, hence their impact on basis spreads 
are near zero. This conclusion reflects the fact that EUROSTOXX50 is significant for 
the Bayer AG, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Unilever NV, LVMH SA and E.ON AG, 
because the P-value is near 0% and the respective coefficient varies between (1.99) for 
Bayer AG and (0.11) for Deutsche Telekom AG and E.ON AG. 
The variable SPREAD5Y is significant for all companies and negative as expected, 
changing from a lower of (12.76) for Deutsche Telekom AG to a higher of (2.19) for 
Unilever NV. In the case of Deutsche Telekom AG, this means that a decrease of 1% of 
the average bid-ask spread of the last 20 days for the CDS-5 year reflects in a decrease 
of 12.76 basis (CDS – ASW spread). This conclusion is also consistent with the 
findings of (Zhu 2006). 
Finally, regarding rating events related variables, this is for DUMA3160 [t+61,90], 
DUMA3160 [t+31,60], DUMA030 [t+1,30], DUMB0110 [t-1,t-10] and DUMB1130 [t-
1,t-30], we didn’t have any finding, hence for Bayer AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, 
Unilever NV and Total SA, we had no credit rating change. For Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG, LVMH SA and E.ON AG, we cannot accept the variables because they are not 
significant (P-values higher than 1%). 
The next figure shows the basis variation of each company. The first line denotes the 
Lehman Brothers bailout and the second refers the CDS Big Bang event. 
Figure 26 Sector analysis: Basis between June 18 2008 and December 31 2012 
 
Assuming that each name is representative of its sector, we denote that companies that 
are in less leveraged sectors are those that basis changes are less severe and negative, 
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those more leveraged sectors like Communications (DEUTSCHE TELEKOM), we have 
assisted quite severe changes on basis and strong negative basis, when compared with 
less leveraged sectors. 
Meanwhile, in order to perform a deeper analysis, it would be necessary to have a 
sample with more sectorial observations. Though, those sectors represented in the prior 
figure can denote some evidence on potential correlation between basis and sectors. 
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Conclusion 
With subprime mortgage crisis, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy and 
European government credit crisis, the CDS market assisted to a generalized turmoil, 
contributing for a decrease of CDS market in more than 50% in less than 3 years. 
From a research-related perspective, the primary contributions of the thesis can be 
divided into two categories: theoretical contribution and empirical contributions. 
Regarding theoretical contribution, we revisited the literature on single-name credit 
modelling and valuing credit derivatives, with special focus on estimating hazard rates, 
where we introduced the optimization method used by Martin et al.  
In relation to empirical contribution, we have actualized (Zhu 2006) work, relative to 
basis determinants analysis for the period between June 18 2008 and December 31 
2012. In respect to liquidity and macro-financial variables, we assisted to similar results 
when comparing with Zhu findings, this means that the market information for both 
derivatives and cash markets are quasi-similar and liquidity has not the same 
explanatory power as other variables to determine the basis. In fact, our findings are that 
the Lehman and Brothers bailout event and the CDS Big Bang have mainly contributed 
to explain and determine the basis. As expected the Lehman and Brothers bailout 
contribute to a wider basis, because of a credit risk perception growth in the market and 
the Big Bang event contribute to a narrowing of the basis spread, because of the 
introduction of new procedures and standardization of CDS contracts. In fact those 
efforts on regulating the credit derivative market are working in the basis reduction, 
through the mitigation of the counterpart risk. 
Furthermore, there are certain potential limitations related to the empirical study that 
need to be addressed. First, consistent data is a prerequisite for obtaining reliable results. 
It has not been possible to obtain CDS spreads from a single data–supplier that is why 
most of the data is from Bloomberg, and the daily blanks are filled with last quoted 
price. This problem was partially mitigated by using the optimization process. 
Even tough, this research could be interesting for derivative desks hence it can 
contribute for the establishment of a premia spread in order to face liquidity risk on 
future events. 
Finally, future research could focus on analysing the impact of ECB liquidity strategies 
on the liquidity in the market and its impact in the diminishment of the spread (bid-
offer). It is also important to understand if the diminishment of the spreads is the 
reflection of a higher turnover of the transactions. Additionally, it would be interesting 
to introduce the sector analysis and study the impact of basis changes in defensive and 
less defensive sectors. 
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1.1 Appendix – Data analysis 
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gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 2637605.343 293067.2604 383.6814614 0.00
Residual 1648 1258791.195 763.8296083
Total 1657 3896396.538
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 93.51 2.33 40.15 0.00
DUMLEHMAN O78.59 4.48 O17.55 0.00
EUROSTOXX50 O1.96 0.09 O21.16 0.00
BAYER_SPREADS5Y O10.85 0.46 O23.43 0.00
DUMA3160([t+61,90]BAYER 0.00 0.00 65535.00 n.a.
DUMA3160([t+31,60]BAYER 0.00 0.00 65535.00 n.a.
DUMA030([t+1,30]BAYER 0.00 0.00 65535.00 n.a.
DUMB0110([tO1,tO10]BAYER 0.00 0.00 65535.00 n.a.
DUMB1130([tO1,tO30]BAYER 0.00 0.00 65535.00 n.a.












DUMLEHMAN 0.107964942 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 ;0.093918693 ;0.072677357 ;0.525983636 1
SPREADS5Y ;0.510315264 ;0.22405211 0.256390064 ;0.353251471 1
DUMA3160?[t+61,90] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMA3160?[t+31,60] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMA030?[t+1,30] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMB0110?[t;1,t;10] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMB1130?[t;1,t;30] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1






















gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 344309.0329 38256.55921 114.1319759 0.00((((((((((((((((((((
Residual 1648 552402.6819 335.1958021
Total 1657 896711.7148
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 20.90 1.60 13.04 0.00
DUMLEHMAN 2.21 2.87 0.77 0.44
EUROSTOXX50 P0.34 0.08 P4.31 0.00
EON_SPREADS5Y P7.03 0.45 P15.64 0.00
DUMA3160([t+61,90]EON P7.91 3.49 P2.27 0.02
DUMA3160([t+31,60]EON P7.44 4.74 P1.57 0.12
DUMA030([t+1,30]EON 6.36 4.69 1.36 0.18
DUMB0110([tP1,tP10]EON 4.99 7.09 0.70 0.48
DUMB1130([tP1,tP30]EON 4.18 4.14 1.01 0.31
EON_BASIS DUMBIGBANG DUMLEHMAN EUROSTOXX50 SPREADS5Y DUMA31609[t+61,90] DUMA31609[t+31,60] DUMA0309[t+1,30] DUMB01109[t@1,t@10] DUMB11309[t@1,t@30]
EON_BASIS 1
DUMBIGBANG 0.514825676 1
DUMLEHMAN 0.198866712 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 0.086215932 =0.072677357 =0.525983636 1
SPREADS5Y =0.470109411 =0.364028818 0.135602678 =0.619536131 1
DUMA3160@[t+61,90] =0.007185573 0.111228148 0.057059999 0.211093163 =0.189739709 1
DUMA3160@[t+31,60] =0.02667504 0.090735856 0.04654746 0.178108823 =0.136306894 0.815763433 1
DUMA030@[t+1,30] =0.000449602 0.063023121 0.032330838 0.105709288 =0.087629113 0.566611261 0.694577911 1
DUMB0110@[t=1,t=10] =0.004080322 =0.036164951 =0.018552606 =0.034406084 0.053475237 0.018662491 0.015224178 0.010574378 1
DUMB1130@[t=1,t=30] =0.018158229 =0.063023121 =0.032330838 =0.061615996 0.0752188 0.03252233 0.026530528 0.018427518 0.573836236 1
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gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 1887545.612 209727.2902 176.7731901 0.00(((((((((((((((((
Residual 1648 1955220.551 1186.420238
Total 1657 3842766.163
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 86.31 3.80 22.69 0.00
DUMLEHMAN O92.77 5.55 O16.72 0.00
EUROSTOXX50 O0.99 0.15 O6.52 0.00
SPREADS5Y O4.69 0.72 O6.49 0.00
DUMA3160([t+61,90] 1.40 6.64 0.21 0.83
DUMA3160([t+31,60] 1.02 8.92 0.11 0.91
DUMA030([t+1,30] O0.83 8.90 O0.09 0.93
DUMB0110([tO1,tO10] 2.85 13.34 0.21 0.83


















DUMLEHMAN 70.02065575 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 0.11745378 70.07267736 70.525983636 1
SPREADS5Y 70.51242893 70.50667705 0.162044693 70.60272002 1
DUMA3160A[t+61,90] 70.02651785 70.11122815 70.057059999 70.17003499 0.06702138 1
DUMA3160A[t+31,60] 70.02848131 70.09073586 70.04654746 70.14380325 0.09542403 0.81576343 1
DUMA030A[t+1,30] 70.03305649 70.06302312 70.032330838 70.05598603 0.08460593 0.56661126 0.69457791 1
DUMB0110A[t71,t710] 0.00637806 0.03616495 0.018552606 70.01244578 70.03818214 0.01866249 0.01522418 0.01057438 1
DUMB1130A[t71,t730] 0.00165359 0.06302312 0.032330838 70.00751266 70.05968282 0.03252233 0.02653053 0.01842752 0.57383624 1






















gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 3813132.449 423681.3833 237.2087 0.00((((((((((((((((((
Residual 1648 2943513.116 1786.112328
Total 1657 6756645.565
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 132.80 3.37 39.44 0.00
DUMLEHMAN O126.22 6.57 O19.22 0.00
EUROSTOXX50 O1.15 0.15 O7.64 0.00
SPREADS5Y O2.88 0.38 O7.48 0.00
DUMA3160([t+61,90] O84.89 7.99 O10.62 0.00
DUMA3160([t+31,60] 5.34 10.92 0.49 0.63
DUMA030([t+1,30] O3.89 10.86 O0.36 0.72
DUMB0110([tO1,tO10] 2.61 16.38 0.16 0.87
DUMB1130([tO1,tO30] 88.09 9.60 9.17 0.00
LUFTHANSA_B













DUMLEHMAN 0.007171746 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 0.067118043 >0.072677357 >0.525983636 1
SPREADS5Y >0.295968814 >0.142886877 0.132439558 >0.388044462 1
DUMA3160A[t+61,90] >0.23294146 0.111228148 0.057059999 >0.059899257 0.136500166 1
DUMA3160A[t+31,60] >0.191533038 0.090735856 0.04654746 >0.018352648 0.1105638 0.815763433 1
DUMA030A[t+1,30] >0.14255071 0.063023121 0.032330838 0.037910735 0.055050054 0.566611261 0.694577911 1
DUMB0110A[t>1,t>10] 0.097868927 >0.036164951 >0.018552606 >0.03844073 >0.064323468 0.018662491 0.015224178 0.010574378 1
DUMB1130A[t>1,t>30] 0.162542721 >0.063023121 >0.032330838 >0.08902879 >0.054224866 0.03252233 0.026530528 0.018427518 0.573836236 1
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gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 1219604.408 135511.6009 183.6338207 0.00((((((((((((((((((
Residual 1648 1216132.832 737.9446793
Total 1657 2435737.24
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 35.82((((((((((( 2.81((((((((((((((( 12.74((((((((((( 0.00((((((((((((
DUMLEHMAN 30.93(O((((((((( ( 4.24((((((((((((((( 7.30(O(((((((((((( 0.00((((((((((((
EUROSTOXX50 0.11(O(((((((((((( 0.11((((((((((((((( 1.05(O(((((((((((( 0.30((((((((((((
SPREADS5Y 12.76(O((((((((( ( 0.78((((((((((((((( 16.42(O((((((((( ( 0.00((((((((((((
DUMA3160([t+61,90] 0 0 65535 n.a.
DUMA3160([t+31,60] 0 0 65535 n.a.
DUMA030([t+1,30] 0 0 65535 n.a.
DUMB0110([tO1,tO10] 0 0 65535 n.a.





















DUMLEHMAN 0.1004051 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 0.23065791 >0.07267736 >0.52598364 1
SPREADS5Y >0.66851919 >0.66012951 >0.17858024 >0.39469407 1
DUMA3160A[t+61,90] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMA3160A[t+31,60] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMA030A[t+1,30] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMB0110A[t>1,t>10] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMB1130A[t>1,t>30] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1






















gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 478869.4662 53207.71847 70.98409026 0.00((((((((((((((((((
Residual 1648 1235295.398 749.5724502
Total 1657 1714164.864
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 6.56(L(((((((((((( 2.66((((((((((((((( 2.46(L(((((((((((( 0.01((((((((((((
DUMLEHMAN 6.90(L(((((((((((( 4.54((((((((((((((( 1.52(L(((((((((((( 0.13((((((((((((
EUROSTOXX50 0.07((((((((((((( 0.10((((((((((((((( 0.74((((((((((((( 0.46((((((((((((
SPREADS5Y 10.93(L((((((((( ( 0.62((((((((((((((( 17.68(L((((((((( ( 0.00((((((((((((
DUMA3160([t+61,90]TOTAL 0 0 65535 n.a
DUMA3160([t+31,60]TOTAL 0 0 65535 n.a
DUMA030([t+1,30]TOTAL 0 0 65535 n.a
DUMB0110([tL1,tL10]TOTAL 0 0 65535 n.a
DUMB1130([tL1,tL30]TOTAL 0 0 65535 n.a













DUMLEHMAN 70.219848156 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 0.303211773 70.072677357 70.525983636 1
SPREADS5Y 70.515317637 70.415715372 0.229457309 70.47822455 1
DUMA3160@[t+61,90] n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1
DUMA3160@[t+31,60] n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1
DUMA030@[t+1,30] n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1
DUMB0110@[t71,t710] n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1
DUMB1130@[t71,t730] n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1
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gl SQ MQ F F)of)Significance
Regression 9 864051.7277 96005.74752 260.4531899 0
Residual 1648 607469.8951 368.6103732
Total 1657 1471521.623
Coef Standard)Error Stat)t P7value
DUMBIGBANG 67.98(( 1.67((((((((((((((( 40.69(((((((((( 0.00((((((((((((
DUMLEHMAN 60.74(O( 3.09((((((((((((((( 19.64(O((((((((( 0.00((((((((((((
EUROSTOXX50 0.37(O(( ( 0.07((((((((((((((( 5.51(O((((((((((( 0.00((((((((((((
SPREADS5Y 2.19(O(( ( 0.57((((((((((((((( 3.85(O((((((((((( 0.00((((((((((((
DUMA3160([t+61,90] 0 0 65535 n.a.
DUMA3160([t+31,60] 0 0 65535 n.a.
DUMA030([t+1,30] 0 0 65535 n.a.
DUMB0110([tO1,tO10] 0 0 65535 n.a.





















DUMLEHMAN 0.026572011 0.51299963 1
EUROSTOXX50 0.102863835 >0.07267736 >0.52598364 1
SPREADS5Y >0.39052236 >0.28198039 0.265397567 >0.48706193 1
DUMA3160A[t+61,90] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMA3160A[t+31,60] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMA030A[t+1,30] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMB0110A[t>1,t>10] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
DUMB1130A[t>1,t>30] n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
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